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With Justice Goldberg's remarks in mind, therefore, the Court of Appeals'
holding in the instant case seems proper (despite the closeness of the decision
as to the company in terms of factual considerations) when viewed in the light
of the Commission's broad obligation to seek out any fraudulent practice which
would impair the maintenance of fair and honest markets. And, even if the
courts were to limit civil liability for damages under the'rule to conduct which
falls just short of the activities in the instant case, the deterrent purposes of
actions brought by the SEC under section 10(b) more than justify the reasoning
of the majority in an area where an ounce of prevention is truly worth a pound
of cure.
GERALD TONER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1866 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT HELD CONSTITU-
TIONAL UNDER THE THIRTEENTH AM:ENDMENT
The Alfred H. Mayer Company refused to sell a new home to Joseph Lee
Jones solely because Jones was a Negro. The home was constructed as part of
the Paddock Woods housing development near St. Louis, Missouri, a housing
development that will ultimately be a suburban community of approximately
one thousand people. Because he was denied the right to purchase the property
solely on the basis of his race, Jones brought an action in a federal district
court against the developers for damages and injunctive relief. He based his
complaint upon 42 U.S.C. section 1982, asserting that this provision prohibits
private discrimination in the sale of real property.1 Alternatively, he argued
that defendant's action violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment since the state was actively involved in the housing development. 2
The defendants moved for a dismissal on the grounds that 42 U.S.C. section
1982 was enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, and therefore is ap-
plicable only where there is action by the state; and that the facts alleged did
not constitute such state action. The district court, holding for the defendants,
the 1933 Act as to not require proof of scienter in an action under that section, 371 F.2d
181, 185 (7th Cir. 1966).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1965) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.
Plaintiffs also claimed that defendants violated other federal statutes, acts, and orders, but
these claims were not determinative in the final disposition of the case.
2. The defendants, acting in corporate form, were licensed by the state and were
protected by state zoning, banking, and lending laws. Approval by a county building
commissioner was required, and other state and county regulations and services were in-
volved. Also, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants themselves fell under the meaning
of the equal protection clause since they exercised the power of municipal government by
providing and maintaining streets, recreation facilities, garbage collection, and other such
services.
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dismissed the action.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed. 4 The Supreme Court
reversed in a seven-two decision, holding that 42 U.S.C. section 1982 "bars
all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of
property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power
of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment." 5 Jones v. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968).
The statute in question, 42 U.S.C. section 1982, is the present version of
section one of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866.6 which was passed pur-
suant to the enabling section of the thirteenth amendment.7 However, many
Congressmen felt that the Act was unconstitutional, as did President Andrew
Johnson who vetoed the bill.8 Nevertheless, the bill was passed over Johnson's
veto by the requisite two-thirds majority of both houses. Within three months,
this same Congress enacted the fourteenth amendment. As a result of this se-
quence of events, courts and commentators have concluded that at least part
of the reason for the passage of the fourteenth amendment was to insure the
3. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 255 F. Supp. 115 (ED. Mo. 1966). State action,
the Court stated, involves discriminatory legislation or judicial enforcement of a discrimina-
tory policy. Additionally, there may be state action when the owners of a development use
public property or public funds in the development or financing of the property.
4. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. -1967). The Court, after
examining the history of the statute, concluded that the Supreme Court has indicated that
the statute's application is limited to those situations where there is state action. The Court
relied especially on Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1947), and the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883), for its finding. The Court suggested, however, that the Supreme Court could
reverse on any one of three grounds: the statute is controlled by the thirteenth amendment
rather than the fourteenth and therefore not limited to state action; the statute, while
limited by the fourteenth amendment, applies because the facts indicated in plaintiffs' com-
plaint were enough to constitute state action; or that state action is no longer a requirement
of the fourteenth amendment.
5. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
6. '14 Stat. 27 (1866). Chapter XXXI is entitled, An Act to protect all Persons in the
United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication. Section one
provides:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
of America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared
to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary not-
withstanding.
7. The thirteenth amendment provides:
Section 1: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2: Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
8. Johnson believed that the rights granted by the bill interfered with powers reserved
solely to the states. See M. Konvitz, A 'Century of Civil Rights 49-50 (1961).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
constitutionality of the 1866 ActY Acceptance of this premise allows for the
conclusion that the fourteenth amendment controls the 1866 Civil Rights Act.10
Since the application of the fourteenth amendment is still limited by the Su-
preme Court to state action," the statute would apply only in cases where
some degree of governmental participation in the discriminatory practice could
be proved.12 On the other hand, if the statute were to be found valid under the
thirteenth amendment, no state participation would have to be shown since the
thirteenth amendment is not so limited.'3
The Supreme Court first discussed the distinction between the scope of
the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments in the Civil Rights Cases.'4 The
Court invalidated portions of the 1875 Civil Rights Act,'5 finding that the
fourteenth amendment cannot be used to sanction legislation which compels a
private citizen not to discriminate on the basis of race. The Court interpreted
the fourteenth amendment as applying only to discrimination by the states.
However, the Court stated that the thirteenth amendment prohibits individual
discriminatory action which imposes a badge or incident of slavery upon the
Negro:
Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the legislation, so far as necessary
or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and involun-
tary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of
individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not; under the
Fourteenth,... it must necessarily be, and can only be, corrective in
its character, addressed to counteract and afford relief against State
regulations or proceedings.'"
The Court stated that Congress, under the thirteenth amendment, can pass "all
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in
the United States."' 7 Thus,
9. See, e.g., F. Biddle, Civil Rights and the Federal Law, in Safeguarding Civil Liberty
Today, 116-117, 120-122 (1949); M. Konvitz, supra note 8, at 51; T. Clark, A Federal
Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 175, 177 (1947). See also, e.g.,
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 379 F.2d 33, 39-40 (8th Cir. 1967); Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1947).
10. See, e.g., M. Konvitz, supra note 8, at 56.
11. The Supreme Court has never expressly recognized that the fourteenth amendment
could be applied to individual actions without the presence of state action, although United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) has been viewed by some observers to be a step in
this direction. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 379 F.2d 33, 41-45 (8th Cir. 1967)
discusses this question.
12. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-12, 23 (1883).
13. Id. at 20, 23.
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See P. Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitution, 132 (1962)
for a discussion of the Civil Rights Cases.
15. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). The 1875 Civil Rights Act was concerned with discrimination
by proprietors of hotels, theaters, railroads, and the like.
16. 109 U.S. at 23.
17. Id. at 20. The 1875 Act, the Court decided, did not deal with any badges and in-
cidents of slavery. Justice Harlan dissented, stating that the thirteenth amendment pro-
hibited discrimination related to slavery. Id. at 26. The disability to hold property was one
of the burdens of slavery, Harlan believed, as the 1866 Act, enacted under the thirteenth
amendment, indicated. Likewise, the 1875 Act dealt with badges and incidents of slavery
and was constitutional under the thirteenth amendment.
596
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the province and scope of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
is different; the former simply abolished slavery: the latter prohibited
the States from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; from depriving them of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, and from denying to any the equal pro-
tection of the laws. The amendments are different, and the powers of
Congress under them are different.' 8
Therefore, the question of whether the 1866 Act is controlled by the thirteenth
or fourteenth amendment is crucial.
Before the fourteenth amendment was adopted, the 1866 Act was held
to be constitutional under the thirteenth amendment by two circuit courts,19
although the question did not reach the Supreme Court in either case. Pursuant
to the fourteenth amendment, which became law in 1868, Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1870, which re-enacted the 1866 Act.20 This re-enact-
ment of the 1866 Act seems to further the notion that Congress intended the
statute's constitutionality to rest upon the fourteenth amendment rather than
thirteenth. Justice Field in a concurring opinion in Virginia v. Rives2 1 empha-
sized this when he said:
The original Civil Rights Act was passed, it is true, before adoption
of [the Fourteenth Amendment]; but great doubt was expressed as to
its validity, and to obtain authority for similar legislation, and thus
obviate the objections which had been raised to its first section, was
one of the objects of the amendment. After its adoption the Civil
Rights Act was re-enacted, and upon the first section of that amend-
ment it rests. That section is directed against the State.22
In relation to the 1866 Act, the Court in the Civil Rights Cases said,
"Whether this legislation was fully authorized by the *Thirteenth Amendment
alone, without the support which it afterward received from the Fourteenth
Amendment, after the adoption of which it was re-enacted with some additions,
it is not necessary to inquire."2 3 This indicates that the Court was undecided,
or at least was not obligated to decide, whether or not the 1866 Act's constitu-
tionality was based upon the thirteenth amendment. However, the Court seemed
confident that the Act was constitutional under the fourteenth amendment,
and thereby subject to the amendment's limitation requiring state action.
18. 109 U.S. at 23.
19. United States v. Rhodes, 27 Fed. Cas. 785 (Kentucky ,1866); In re Turner, 24 Fed.
Cas. 337 (Maryland 1867).
20. 16 Stat. 144 (1870). Section 18 of Chapter CXIV provides:
And be it further enacted, That the act to protect all persons in the United States in
their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication, passed April nine,
eighteen hundred and sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted.
21. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
22. Id. at 333. This is dictum, as the Supreme Court in the instant case pointed out.
See text at infra note 73. Nevertheless, this ruling was followed by succeeding courts. See
also, F. Biddle, supra note 9, at 122.
23. 109 U.S. at 22.
24. See M. Konvitz, supra note 8, at 104.
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In Hodges v. United States25 the Court again seemed to read the pro-
visions of the 1866 Civil Rights Act as coming under the fourteenth amend-
ment and thereby requiring state action.26 The Court held that private
interference with the freedom to contract was not a federal crime under the
1866 or 1870 Civil Rights Acts, even though the interference occurred solely
because of racial discrimination. If there was state action involved, the four-
teenth amendment would apply. Since there was no state action, if any federal
crime were committed, it would have to be a crime under the thirteenth amend-
ment 27 The Court used the tenth amendment rationale28 to find that such
discrimination came under state jurisdiction only, since the power to legislate
against discrimination was not enumerated as a federal power, even under the
thirteenth amendment. The Court said,
The meaning of [the Thirteenth Amendment] is as clear as language
can make it. The things denounced are slavery and involuntary servi-
tude, and Congress is given power to enforce that denunciation. All
understand by these terms a condition of enforced compulsory service
of one to another. While the inciting cause of the Amendment was the
emancipation of the colored race, yet it is not an attempt to commit
that race to the care of the Nation. It is the denunciation of a condi-
tion and not a declaration in favor of a particular people.p
Thus, infringement of freedom to contract is a wrong, as the Court admitted,
but it does not constitute enslavement. The thirteenth amendment, the Court
said, does not authorize Congress to declare all private racial discrimination
a federal crime. This kind of discrimination is solely for the states to control.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, stated that the thirteenth amendment gave Congress
the power to enact legislation to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery;
and discrimination in the making of contracts was a badge and incident of
slavery. °
Again interpreting the thirteenth amendment narrowly, the Supreme Court
25. 203 U.S. 1 (1906). Negroes were prevented by their employers from the free exer-
cise of their right to work under a labor contract solely because of their race. Several Negroes
contracted to work for wages for defendant Hodges. Thereafter, Hodges, conspiring with
others, threatened and coerced the Negroes to force them to abandon their contracts.
26. Congress had included the freedom to contract with the right to purchase property
in the 1866 Act. Since the Court in Hodges required state action if there was to be infringe-
ment upon the freedom to contract, it is implied that the whole 1866 Act would also be
limited by the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. It is important to
note that the Court in the instant case overruled Hodges as it was inconsistent with the
instant holding. See text at infra note 87.
27. The Government contended that sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 5508, and 55,10 of the
Revised Statutes were the controlling statutes, and they were constitutional under the thir-
teenth amendment. Sections 1977, 1978, and 1979 of the Revised Statutes are presently U.S.C.
sections 1981, 1982, and 1983, and all were derived from the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
28. The tenth amendment provides:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
29. 203 U.S. at 16-17.
30. Harlan recounted the history of the thirteenth amendment, the legislation that
followed, and court interpretations, and came to the opposite conclusion of the majority.
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in Corrigan v. Buckley32 said, "The Thirteenth Amendment denouncing slavery
and involuntary servitude, that is, a condition of enforced compulsory service
of one to another, does not in other matters protect the individual rights of
persons of the Negro race."32 Thus, the Court felt that the thirteenth amend-
ment only protects against slavery, not its badges and incidents. The Court also
said that none of the amendments prohibited private individuals from entering
into contracts respecting the control and disposition of their own property,
33
i.e., restrictive covenants. Thils, the restrictive covenant in the Corrigan case
was not found prohibited by any of the amendments, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 could apply only under the fourteenth amendment which prohibits
discriminatory action by the states alone 4
In Shelley v. Kraemer3 5 and Hurd v. Hodge3 6 the Supreme Court, in
expanding the concept of state action to state and federal court enforcement of
restrictive covenants, again considered the 1866 Civil Rights Act to be con-
trolled by the fourteenth amendment, governmental action therefore being
necessary in order for the statute to apply. The Court, relying upon Corrigan
v. Buckley, stated:
We may start with the proposition that the statute does not invalidate
private restrictive agreements so long as the purposes of those agree-
ments are achieved by the parties through voluntary adherence to the
terms. The action toward which the provisions of the statute under
consideration is directed is governmental action. Such was the holding
of Corrigan v. Buckley... 
In its analysis, the Court in Hurd pointed out that many Congressmen sup-
ported the fourteenth amendment when it was introduced because it enacted
into the organic law of the land guarantees of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, thus
eliminating any constitutional doubts about the Act.3 8
The only decision contrary to these cases was the district court case of
United States v. Morris 9 The case involved a private conspiracy to prevent a
Negro from leasing and cultivating farmland solely because of his race. The
Court held that the 1866 Civil Rights Act applied to individual discriminatory
31. 271 U.S. 323 (1926). This case dealt with a restrictive covenant. Corrigan, having
signed an agreement with other white property owners not to sell to non-whites, sold
property to Curtis, a Negro. A co-covenantor brought this action to have the agreemelit
enforced.
32. 271 U.S. at 330.
33. Id. at 331.
34. The Supreme Court in the instant case considered this to be dictum. See text at
infra note 62. However, succeeding courts had followed it as the law. See, e.g., Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1947), text at infra note 37. See also King, The Right to Occupancy
Without Discrimination, in Legal Aspects of the Civil Rights Movement, 132 (King and
Quick eds. -1965).
35. 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
36. 334 U.S. 24 (1947).
37. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. at 31. This was considered to be dictum by the Court
in the instant case. See text at infra note 62.
38. 334 U.S. at 32-33.
39. 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
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.action and was valid under the thirteenth amendment. This amendment, the
-Court claimed, extended federal powers. 40 It removed the disability of slavery
from the Negro and made him a citizen. Every citizen is a freeman endowed
with certain rights and privileges, and no law or statute is needed to insure
these rights and privileges. These fundamental, or natural, rights, recognized
among all free people, were enumerated in the Declaration of Independence
as unalienable rights, among which are "life, liberty and the pursuit of hap-
piness." 41 As stated in Corfield v. Coryell,42 one bf the fundamental rights was,
"[t]o take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal." 43 Thus,
Congress possesses the power under the thirteenth amendment to prevent private
discrimination in the purchase and sale of real property.
Notwithstanding the district court's opinion in United States v. Morris,
the Supreme Court, prior to Jones v. Mayer Co., had consistently viewed the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 as being subject to the fourteenth amendment rather
than the thirteenth. However, the Supreme Court never adjudicated this pre-
cise issue since it was always supplementary to the determination of each case.44
The importance of the determination of this issue, as the Civil Rights Cases
first indicated, is that the fourteenth amendment is limited to discriminatory
action by the states, whereas the thirteenth amendment is applicable to dis-
criminatory actions by individuals as well as by states. The cases are not clear,
however, as to what kinds of discriminatory actions by private individuals
could be regulated under the thirteenth amendment. The Court in the Civil
Rights Cases, for example, stated that the thirteenth amendment gave Congress
the power to legislate against the "badges and incidents" of slavery; 4 but the
Court in Hodges v. United States stated that the amendment was only a "de-
nunciation of a condition"; 46 and in Corrigan v. Buckley it was said that the
amendment did not "in other matters protect the individual rights of persons
of the Negro race." 47 Thus, if the 1866 Civil Rights Act were found to be valid
under the thirteenth amendment, the meaning of the amendment would still
have to be clarified.
The first problem facing the Court in Jones v. Mayer Co. was whether
the Court should have granted certiorari on the basis of section 1982 in light
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.48 Justice Stewart, for the majority, felt that
40. Id. at 325.
41. Id.
42. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
43. As quoted in United States v. Morris, 125 F. at 326. This has been approved by
the Supreme Court in such cases as the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 75, 97 (1872);
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762, 764 (1883); and Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 248 (1898).
44. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 419-420 (1968).
45. See text at supra note 17.
46. See text at supra note 29.
47. See text at supra note 32.
48. 82 Stat. K1 (1968). The Court here is concerned with the Fair Housing Title (Title
VIII) of the Act.
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section 1982 is substantially different from the 1968 Act in that section 1982
deals only with racial discrimination, while the 1968 Act also deals with dis-
crimination based upon religion or national origin.49 The scope of the 1968
Act, he said, was much greater than the scope of section 1982.0 Thus, Justice
Stewart felt that while section 1982 is "a general statute applicable only to
racial discrimination in the rental and sale of property and enforceable only
by private parties acting on their own initiative,"51 the 1968 Act is "a detailed
housing law, applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and en-
forceable by a complete arsenal of federal authority.' 52 Additionally, since the
1968 Act does not mention section 1982, the Court cannot assume Congress
meant to effect a change in the prior statute without specifically saying so.e3
In fact, section 815 of the 1968 Act specifically provides: "Nothing in this title
shall be construed to invalidate or limit any law of... any... jurisdiction in
which this title shall be effective, that grants, guarantees, or protects the ...
rights ...granted by this title. . . .."5 Thus, Justice Stewart concluded that
the 1968 Act has no effect upon the Jones case or section 1982.
In construing section 1982, Justice Stewart stated that it, in "plain and
unambiguous terms, . . . grants to all citizens, without regard to race or color,
'the same right' to purchase and lease property 'as is enjoyed by white
citizens.' ,55 It is possible for private individuals, as well as the State or its
agents, to interfere with this right.55 Whenever property is placed on the market
for whites only, regardless of any governmental action, Negroes are denied a
right enjoyed by whites; and this is the evil which the statute attempts to
rectify. 57 Even the respondents seemed to concede that if section 1982 "means
what it says,"58 it not only prohibits officially sanctioned segregation in housing,
but also prohibits purely private discrimination.5 9 However, this literal interpre-
tation seemed like such a "revolutionary implication," that the respondents
argued that such was not the intent of Congress when it enacted the original
statute in 1866.00 Such cases as Hurd v. Hodge and Corrigan v. Buckley seemed
49. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 413.
50. Id. at 413-414. In delimiting the scope of § 1982, Justice Stewart stated:(Section 1982) does not deal specifically with discrimination in the provision of
services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling. It does not
prohibit advertising or other representations that indicate discriminatory prefer-
ences. It does not refer explicitly to discrimination in financing arrangements or in
the provision of brokerage services. It does not empower a federal administrative
agency to assist aggrieved parties. It makes no provision for intervention by the
Attorney General. And, although it can be enforced by injunction, it contains no
provision expressly authorizing a federal court to order the payment of damages.
51. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 417.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 416417 n.20.
54. Id. at 417 n.20.
55. 392 U.S. at 420.
56. Id. at 421.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 421-422.
60. Id. at 422.
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to agree with the respondents' argument that the statute fell under the govern-
ment action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. In order to overcome
this contention, Justice Stewart indiciated that these cases never adjudicated
the precise question presented by the Jones case, i.e., "whether purely private
discrimination, unaided by any action on the part of government, would violate
§ 1982 if its effect were to deny a citizen the right to rent or buy property
solely because of his race or color. "6 1 Thus, as Justice Stewart stated, the propo-
sition that section 1982 required state action was merely dictum in all these
cases.
62
To further emphasize that Congress meant exactly what it said in section
1982, Justice Stewart reviewed the relevant history of the statute. In doing so,
he constantly referred to Congressional speeches and testimony when the 1866
Civil Rights Act was before Congress. The structure of the bill and its language
point to the conclusion that private as well as public discrimination was to be
prohibited.63 The language of the bill was far broader than would have been
necessary if Congress had just wanted to strike down discriminatory statutes
and other state action.6 Also, Congress at that time had before it much evidence
of private discrimination that needed to be corrected. 6r The 1866 Act was
passed to put into practical effect the principle of the thirteenth amendment,
i.e., to make the former slaves actually free" After examining the arguments
for and against the bill, Justice Stewart concluded that most, if not all, of the
congressmen understood its broad applicability. 7 He summarized the Court's
finding when he stated:
In light of the concerns that led Congress to adopt it and the contents
of the debates that preceded its passage, it is clear that the Act was
designed to do just what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial dis-
crimination, whether or not under color of law, with respect to the
rights enumerated therein-including the right to purchase or lease
property.68
justice Stewart found, that re-enactment of the Act in 1870, two years after
the fourteenth amendment became law, did not change its scope. It is true, he
admitted, that some members of Congress supported the fourteenth amendment
"in order to eliminate doubt as to the constitutional validity of the Civil Rights
Act as applied to the States."6 9 However, this is no grounds for asserting that
61. Id. at 419-420.
62. Id. at 419.
63. Id. at 424-426.
64. Id. at 426-427.
65. Id. at 427.
66. Id. at 427-436. Justice Stewart quoted extensively from Illinois Senator Trumbull's
speeches to the Senate when he introduced and fought for the Act. It is apparent that Trum-
bull worried that the states and "prevailing public sentiment" would deprive Negroes of
their rights, and for this reason the law was passed.
67. 392 U.S. at 427-436.
68. Id. at 436.
69. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33, as quoted in Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 436.
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the re-enactment of the 1866 Act after the fourteenth amendment imposed a
limitation of state action on its application. Aside from there being no factual
basis for such speculation, Justice Stewart also asserted that the conditions
prevailing in 1870 make it highly implausible, since by that time most, if not
all, of the Confederate States were under the control of "reconstructed" legisla-
tures that had formally repudiated racial discrimination.70 The focus of Con-
gressional concern, therefore, had shifted from discriminatory state statutes to
the activities of non-governmental groups like the Ku Klux Klan.71 Justice
Stewart concluded from this analysis that the Court has no basis to assume
that Congress made a silent decision in 1870 to exempt discrimination from
the operation of the 1866 Act.72 The determination to the contrary in such
cases as Virginia v. Rives and Hurd v. Hodge was characterized as dictum by
Justice Stewart.73 The 1870 Act merely provided that the 1866 law "is hereby
re-enacted," and that is all Congress meant; it did not mean to limit the 1866
Act, for if it did, it would have said so. As Justice Stewart stated, "The cardinal
rule is that repeals by implication are not favored." 74
The final question for the Court to resolve was whether Congress has the
power under the Constitution to prohibit all racial discrimination, private and
public, in the sale and rental of property.75 Quoting from the Civil Rights
Cases, Justice Stewart concluded that Congress can enforce the thirteenth
amendment by appropriate legislation, including laws regulating the acts of
individuals:
"By its own unaided force and effect," the Thirteenth Amendment
"abolished slavery and established universal freedom." . . . Whether
or not the Amendment itself did any more than that-a question not
involved in this case-it is at least clear that the Enabling Clause of
that Amendment empowered Congress to do much more. For that
clause clothed "Congress with the power to pass all laws necessary
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States."76
The question then becomes whether section 1982 is "appropriate legisla-
tion."7 7 Justice Stewart quoted Senator Trumbull of Illinois, who had brought
the proposal for the thirteenth amendment to the Senate floor in 1864 believing
that it would allow Congress to pass appropriate legislation to enforce the
amendment. 78 Justice Stewart, agreeing with Senator Trumbull, stated that Con-
gress does have the authority to pass pertinent legislation to accomplish a
70. 392 U.S. at 436.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 437.
73. Id. n.73.
74. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503, as quoted in Jones v. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437.
75. 392 U.S. at 437.
76. Id. at 439.
77. Id. at 439-441.
78. Id. at 440.
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specified end, i.e., the abolition of slavery.19 But Congress must be rational in
its choice of legislation, 0 and in the instant case, Justice Stewart believed Con-
gress was rational.81 It is a form of slavery, he felt, to "herd" men into ghettos
and make their ability to buy property dependant upon the color of their skin.82
As Justice Stewart explained,
At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure
under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy what-
ever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can
live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least this
much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation
cannot keep.83
Exclusion of Negroes by whites from white communities, therefore, is merely
another form of slavery, replacing the now defunct Black Codes which were
discriminatory statutes enacted by the states after slavery was abolished.8 4
Further emphasizing Congressional power under the thirteenth amendment,
Justice Stewart pointed out that the majority and dissent in the Civil Rights
Cases agreed on at least one issue:
The Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress not only to outlaw
all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude but also to eradicate the
last vestiges and incidents of a society half slave and half free, by
securing to all citizens, of every race and color, "the same right to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens."8 5
As for Hodges v. United States, which differed with this interpretation by con-
struing the thirteenth amendment much more narrowly,88 Justice Stewart over-
ruled it as it is inconsistent with the holding in Jones.87
Thus, Justice Stewart concluded that Congress has the power under the
enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment to enact any legislation which
is appropriate to eradicate badges and incidents of slavery. In interpreting this
clause, he followed the same rationale applied by Chief Justice Marshall in
interpreting the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I of the Constitution:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.88
79. Id.
8o. Id.
81. Id. at 440-441.
82. Id. at 442-443.
83. Id. at 443.
84. Id. at 441-442.
85. Id. at 441 n.78.
86. See text at supra notes 25-30 for a discussion of the Hodge case.
87. 392 U.S. at 441-443 n.78.
88. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819), as quoted in Jones v. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
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In quoting Representative Wilson of Iowa, who was the floor manager of the
1866 Act in the House of Representatives, Justice Stewart then concluded:
The end is legitimate . . . because it is defined by the Constitution
itself. The end is the maintenance of freedom .... A man who enjoys
the civil rights mentioned in this bill cannot be reduced to slavery...
This settles the appropriateness of this measure, and that settles its
constitutionality."9
Justice Stewart's opinion in the instant case clarifies the scope of Con-
gressional power under the thirteenth amendment. The construction of this
amendment had become unclear after the broad interpretation given in the
Civil Rights Casesf90 Justice Stewart, by upholding this broad interpretation,
recognized that under the thirteenth amendment Congress may enact any
legislation appropriate to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery; and
Congress has the power to determine what constitutes a badge and incident of
slavery so long as this determination is rational. This means that Congress is
not limited to legislation preventing state sanctioned discrimination, as under
the fourteenth amendment, or legislation preventing discrimination connected
with interstate commerce. 9 ' Since the thirteenth amendment applies to private
actions, Congress therefore has much greater authority to deal with problems of
racial discrimination under this amendment.
That Justice Stewart upheld the 1866 statute under the thirteenth amend-
ment rather than the fourteenth emphasizes that the Court intended to clarify
the thirteenth amendment and gives notice that this amendment could be used
to justify federal legislation against discrimination by private individuals. The
Court could easily have upheld the statute under the fourteenth amendment,
as previous cases have suggested; and in light of United States v. Guest,9 2
the Court could have found the presence of state action0 3 The Guest case
indicated that state action may be present in even the most vicarious manner:
. . . the involvement of the state need [not] be either exclusive or
direct. In a variety of situations the Court has found state action of a
nature sufficient to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause
even though the participation of the State was peripheral, or its action
was only one of several co-operative forces leading to the constitutional
violation.94
Thus, had the Court upheld the statute under the fourteenth amendment, it
89. 392 U.S. at 443-444.
90. See text at supra notes 16-18 for a discussion of the thirteenth amendment as con-
strued by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases.
91. Congress has used the commerce clause, for example, to authorize provisions of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act dealing with public accommodations and food sales. Since almost
everything today has some relation to interstate commerce, Congress can use this clause to
authorize practically any legislation it wishes to prevent racial discrimination.
92. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
93. See supra note 2.
94. 383 U.S. at 755-756.
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could easily have found the presence of state action by using the rationale of
the Guest case, and the plaintiffs would recover as they did under the thirteenth
amendment approach. It appears that the Court recognized the need for the
clarification of the thirteenth amendment and decided the case accordingly,
since it would have been easier, and perhaps sounder in light of previous
decisions, to use the fourteenth amendment approach.
Also, instead of requiring that state action be necessary for the fourteenth
amendment to apply, the Court could have recognized that Congress, under the
fourteenth amendment, could enact legislation which would regulate private
actions as well as state actions. The Court has not yet expressly recognized
this interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, and the Jones case could have
been used to do so. 5
In finding the statute valid under the thirteenth amendment, justice
Stewart relied a great deal upon the legislative history of the statute. To
reach his conclusion, he had to disregard the finding by the Court in other cases
that the statute fell under the fourteenth amendment. As Justice Harlan's dis-
sent demonstrated, Justice Stewart's finding, if not wrong, is at least open to
serious doubt.00 Since the whole premise of Justice Stewart's decision was based
upon a finding that was at best doubtful, Justice Harlan contended that certiorari
should not have been granted.
To further emphasize his contention that the case should have been dismissed
on the ground that certiorari was improvidently granted, Justice Harlan claimed
that the 1968 Civil Rights Act would remove most of the impact of the case in
the area of open housing.97 To rebut this contention, Justice Stewart argued that
the 1866 and 1968 Acts were substantially different 8 and the Court's decision
would not affect the operation of the 1968 Act.9 However, the 1968 Act does not
affect transactions with respect to single family homes owned by a party who
owns less than four houses, whereas the 1866 Act would apply to such trans-
actions. Thus, the 1866 Act covers an area that Congress in 1968 did not want
to control. As a result, Justice Stewart's interpretation of the 1866 Act goes
even further than the 1968 Act in some instances with respect to racial dis-
crimination, and therefore the Court is legislating beyond the intent of Congress
in 1968. Therefore, Justice Stewart's construction of 42 U.S.C. section 1982
affects the operation of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 because the statute can
be applied to regulate an area greater, in some respects, than Congress intended
in 1968.
Although, as Justice Stewart contends, the scopes of section 1982 and the
95. See supra note 11.
96. The dissent, in reviewing the history of the 1866 Act, contradicted the majority
position. The quotation of Representative Shellabarger, a supporter of the bill, was especially
damaging, as he said that the bill had no impact on "mere private wrongs," and that it wasintended only for wrongs inflicted "under color of state authority." 392 U.S. at 449-480.
97. 392 U.S. at 478.
98. See text at supra notes 49-50.
99. See text at supra notes 48-54.
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1968 Act may be substantially different, the impact of the Jones case is still
minimal in the field of open housing. The 1968 Act applies to practically
everything the statute would cover, and more, as Justice Stewart indicated.100
Furthermore, the burden of proof under section 1982 makes it almost useless
as a remedy. In the Jones case, the defendants admitted that racial discrimina-
tion was the sole reason for not selling the property to the plaintiffs. In the
future, to be realistic, such an admission would be very unlikely, and the dis-
crimination could be disguised so as to make it almost impossible to prove by
other evidentiary means. It would therefore be easier to use the 1968 Civil
Rights Act because of such provisions as those that relate to advertising, services,
facilities, and federal assistance to aggrieved parties. 10 ' Thus, it is reasonable to
argue that the impact of the case is minimal in the area of open housing, and
this fact combined with the other weaknesses of the majority decision could lead
to the conclusion that certiorari should not have been granted.
Despite the weaknesses in the foundation of Justice Stewart's opinion, the
Jones case stands as a possible landmark in the area of civil rights under the
thirteenth amendment. The federal government is no longer restricted to com-
bating racial discrimination only as it applies to state action or interstate com-
merce, although the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause have both
provided Congress with broad powers to legislate against racial discrimination.
However, by use of the thirteenth amendment, Congress can legislate directly
at the source of the evil of racial discrimination rather than incidentally, as it
does when it employs the commerce clause; and it does not have to look for
governmental involvement in discriminatory practices in order to legislate
against racial discrimination as it does under the fourteenth amendment. Con-
gress therefore does not have to disguise its legislation with the mantle of the
commerce clause, or dilute it with the requirement of state action. Racial dis-
crimination is an outgrowth of slavery in this country, and Congress can use the
thirteenth amendment, which abolishes slavery, to try to eliminate such dis-
crimination.
HowARD E. FENTON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-ALLEGED PAROLE
VIOLATOR HAS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A PAROLE REVOCATION HEARING
Petitioner, an alleged parole violator, requested that retained counsel be
allowed to represent him at a parole revocation hearing. The Board of Parole
denied the request on the ground that the New York Correction Law provides
that a parolee is not entitled to be represented by counsel at a revocation hear-
100. See text at supra notes 49-50.
101. See supra note 50.
